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Abstract
Bargaining under uncertainty is modeled by the assumption that there
are several possible states of nature, each of which is identied with a
bargaining problem. We characterize bargaining solutions which gen-
erate ex ante ecient combinations of outcomes under the assumption
that the bargainers have minimax regret preferences. For the case of
two bargainers a class of monotone utopia-path solutions is character-
ized by the eciency criterion, but for more than two bargainers only
dictatorial solutions are ecient. By incorporating scale covariance
into the minimax regret preferences a possibility result is obtained for
the general case.
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11 Introduction
An n-person bargaining problem is a set of feasible utility n-tuples together
with a prespecied n-tuple, the disagreement outcome (cf. Nash, 1950). The
utilities represent the preferences of the bargainers. These may vary from
preferences over lottery sets, represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity functions, to prot functions of rms in an oligopoly situation. Depending
on the situation, there may be uncertainty concerning the exact shape of the
bargaining problem. For instance, demand functions in an oligopoly situa-
tion may be subject to stochastic inﬂuences. A common way to model such
uncertainty is to assume that there are several states of nature, exactly one
of which will be realized as the true state. In the present context, a state of
nature can be identied with a specic bargaining problem.
A bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) assigns a feasible utility n-tuple to
every bargaining problem. Thus, implicitly, a bargaining solution aggregates
the individual preferences of the bargainers into a collective outcome. In the
case of uncertainty, a bargaining solution assigns a utility n-tuple to each
possible bargaining problem, i.e., to each possible state of nature. Given a
specic bargaining solution to be employed, each bargainer ex ante faces a list
of possible outcomes, exactly one of which will be realised. We assume that,
in order to evaluate dierent lists of possible outcomes, each bargainer has a
preference relation over such lists. In more economic terms, each bargainer
has a criterion to decide between several contingent contracts. Although
most bargaining solutions in the literature are ex post ecient, this does
not imply that they are also ex ante ecient. This raises the following
questions. For a given criterion for decision making under uncertainty, which
bargaining solution(s) lead(s) to ex ante ecient contingent contracts and,
conversely, for a given bargaining solution, does there exist a criterion for
decision making under uncertainty according to which a contingent contract
prescribed by that bargaining solution is ex ante ecient?
By answering these questions, we obtain a new view on bargaining solu-
tions, as aggregators of individual preferences under uncertainty. Further-
more, the approach leads to characterizations of bargaining solutions that
are dierent from the usual axiomatizations and from noncooperative imple-
mentations, both of which were initiated by Nash (1950, 1953).
The rst paper concerned with this approach is Bossert et al. (1996)
in which|as the main result|a class of strictly monotone path solutions
2is characterized by imposing ex ante eciency with respect to the maximin
criterion. According to this criterion the minimal gains with respect to the
disagreement point should be maximized.
In the present paper we consider the minimax regret criterion, where
regret is measured with respect to the utopia payos, i.e., the maximal at-
tainable payos. In particular, we study solutions that are ex ante ecient
with respect to this criterion. For the two-person case, we show that this
criterion determines a class of monotone paths, originating from the utopia
point, of which the intersection with the Pareto optimal boundary is the
solution point. For the n-person case (n>2) it turns out that only the
dictatorial solutions are ex ante ecient with respect to the minimax regret
criterion. Modifying the criterion such that it is compatible with scale co-
variance, however, leads to a characterization of solutions determined by a
monotone path between the normalized utopia and disagreement points. As
will be indicated, these solutions can alternativelybe characterizedby ex ante
eciencywith respect to a versionof the maximincriterionthat is compatible
with scale covariance. They include the Raia-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
(Raia, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and main denitions. Section 3 deals with the minimax regret criterion
and presents the positive result for n = 2 and the negative one for n>2. In
Section 4 the minimaxregret criterion is normalized in a way compatible with
scale covariance, leading to the characterization announced earlier. Section
5 concludes.
2 Model and main denitions
An n-person (bargaining) problem is a set S  I Rn such that there is a point
 d 2 S with S   d + I Rn
+, S is compact, contains a vector x> d ,a n di s
strictly comprehensive,t h a ti s ,f o ra l lx2Sand y 2 I Rn,i f dyx
with y 6= x,t h e ny2Sand there is a z 2 S with z>y . 1 Elements of
1The set of all nonnegative vectors in I Rn is denoted by I Rn
+,a n dI R n
−is the set of all
nonpositive vectors. The set of all strictly positive vectors in I Rn is denoted by I Rn
++.A
sum like  d+ I Rn
+ denotes the usual vector addition, that is,  d + I Rn
+ := f d +x j x 2 I Rn
+g.
For any two vectors x;y 2 I Rn, x>(  ) ymeans xi > ()yi for all i =1 ;:::;n.T h e
inequalities < and  are dened analogously.
3S are called feasible outcomes, while  d is called the disagreement outcome.
The interpretation is that  d results if the bargainers fail to reach some other
outcome x 2 S.N o t e t h a t d is uniquely determined by S,s ot h a tw ec a n
write  d = d(S). The i-th coordinate of an outcome represents the utility
to bargainer i. Throughout, we assume n  2t ob e x e d . T h es e to f
bargainers is denoted by N := f1;:::;ng,a n dBdenotes the class of all
n-person bargaining problems.
Compactness is a standard condition in bargaining theory. By the re-
quirement S  d(S)+I R n
+ we exclude nonindividually rational outcomes
from consideration. Comprehensiveness can be interpreted as disposability
of utility. Strict comprehensiveness additionally implies that every weakly
Pareto optimal outcome is also strongly Pareto optimal, so that it suces to
dene, for a bargaining problem S,
P(S): =f x2Sj8 y2S[ yx)y=x ] g ;
the Pareto set of S. Restricting attention to strictly comprehensive problems
facilitates the exposition, see also Section 5.2
A (bargaining) solution is a mapping F : B!I R nwith F(S) 2 S for all
S 2B .As o l u t i o nFis called Pareto optimal if F(S) 2 P(S) for all S 2B . 3
In order to introduce uncertainty into the model we assume that there
are a nite number of states of nature, exactly one of which will be realised.
It is without loss of generality and easier for the exposition of the results
to assume that there are only two states. A (bargaining) problem under
uncertainty is, thus, dened by a pair (S;S0) 2BB .
For each problem under uncertainty (S;S0), we assume that each bar-
gainer i has a preference relation (i.e., a complete and transitive binary
relation) i over pairs (x;x0) 2 S  S0 which depends only on the i-th
coordinates (xi;x 0
i) and which is weakly monotonic. The latter means that
(x;x0) i (y;y0) whenever xi >y iand x0
i >y 0
i,w h e r e idenotes the asym-
metric part of i. A preferencerelation with these properties is calledregular.
Note that, by denition, such a preference relation depends on the problem
under uncertainty (S;S0). We will, however, also use a notation like i to
2Observe that we do not impose the usual convexity assumption on the bargainingprob-
lem. All our results, however, would go through without modication if this assumption
were added.
3We use the expression \Pareto optimal" rather than \ecient" to distinguish this
property from the eciency condition related to uncertainty, to be introduced below.
4denote bargainer i's preferences for every problem in BB; if all these pref-
erences are regular, then also i is called regular.
Let F be a bargaining solution, and let  =(  1 ;:::; n), where i
is regular for every i 2 N.W e c a l l F ecient with respect to  if for
all (S;S0) 2B Band all (x;x0) 2 S  S0 there is a bargainer i with
(F(S);F(S0)) i (x;x0). In other words, there is no \contingent contract"
which is strictly preferred by all bargainers to the contract assigned by F.
The following lemma shows that eciency with respect to a prole of regular
preferences implies Pareto optimality.
Lemma 1 Let F be a bargaining solution, and let  =(  1 ;:::; n), with
i regular for every i 2 N.L e tFbe ecient with respect to . Then F is
Pareto optimal.
Proof Let S 2Band x 2 SnP(S). By the strict comprehensiveness of
S,t h e r ei say2Swith y>x . It follows that F(S) 6= x, for otherwise
(y;y) i (F(S);F(S)) in (S;S)b yr e g u l a r i t yo f ifor all i, violating e-
ciency of F with respect to . This completes the proof.
2
In this paper we only consider regular preferences. In particular, we exclude
(possibly interesting) preferences which do not only depend on a bargainer
i's own coordinates.
3 Minimax regret
The utopia point u(S)o fap r o b l e mS2Bis dened by
ui(S): =m a x
x 2 S x i
for every i 2 N. Bargainer i's minimax regret preference u
i is dened as
follows. For all (S;S0) 2B Band all (x;x0);(y;y0) 2 SS0,( x;x0) u
i (y;y0)
if
maxfui(S) − xi;u i(S
0)−x
0





i is regular for every bargainer i.
In order to study bargaining solutions that are ecient with respect to
minimax regret preferences we rst show that this condition implies a mono-
tonicity condition, as specied by the following lemma. The lemma is an
adaptation of Lemma 2 in Bossert et al. (1996).
5Lemma 2 Let the bargaining solution F be ecient with respect to u =
(u
1;:::; u
n).L e tS;T 2B .L e tx=F ( S )and y = F(T). Then u(S) − x 
u(T)− y or u(S)− x  u(T) − y.
Proof Suppose not. Then there are i;j 2 N with ui(S) − xi >u i( T)−y i
whereas uj(S)−xj <u j( T)−y j.L e tI:= fk 2 N j uk(S)−xk >u k( T)−y kg
and J := fk 2 N j uk(S) − xk <u k( T)−y kg .N o t et h a tI;J 6= ; and that
uk(S) − xk > 0 for all k 2 I and uk(T) − yk > 0 for all k 2 J. By this and
strict comprehensiveness we can nd x0 2 S and y0 2 T with
8k 2 I : uk(S) − xk >u k( S )−x 0
k>u k( T)−y k
8 k2Nn I: u k( S)−x k<u k( S )−x 0
k
8 k2J: u k( T)−y k>u k( T)−y 0
k>u k( S)−x k
8 k2Nn J: u k( T)−y k<u k( T)−y 0
k:
By construction, (x0;y0) u
k (x;y) for all k 2 N, which is a violation of e-
ciency of F with respect to u.
2
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 in particular imply translation covariance of the
solution F under consideration, i.e., F(S)+b=F( S+b ) for all S 2Band
b 2 I Rn (this follows from taking T = S + b in Lemma 2).
For every i 2 N let Di denote the dictatorial solution for player i.T h i s
solution assigns to every S 2Bthe point with i-th coordinate equal to ui(S)
and every other coordinate j equal to dj(S). A solution F is a dictatorial
solution if there exists i 2 N such that F = Di. Our rst theorem is an
impossibility result: if n>2, there exists no ecient and nondictatorial
solution.
Theorem 1 Let n>2 , and let F be a bargaining solution. Then F is
ecient with respect to u =(  u
1;:::; u
n)if, and only if, F is a dictatorial
solution.
Proof The if-part is left to the reader. For the only-if part it is, in view
of Lemma 2, sucient to prove that for every S 2Bthere is an i 2 N
with F(S)=D i( S ). Suppose this is not true, and let S 2Bbe such that
x := F(S) <u ( S ). By translation covariance (see the remark following the
proof of Lemma 2) we may assume without loss of generality that u(S)=
(1;1;:::;1). Choose  2 I R with <x 1+x 2−1, hence x1 +x2 >+1a n d
6<1. Choose  2 I R with x3 <<1, and let
L := convex hull of f(;;;;:::;);(;;1;;:::;);z
i ji2Nnf3gg;
where zi has i-th coordinate equal to 1, third coordinate equal to ,a n d
all other coordinates equal to .O b s e r v e t h a tu ( L )=( 1 ;1 ;:::;1) = u(S).
In view of Lemma 2, x3 < , and the fact that every point in L has third
coordinate at least equal to , it follows that F(L)  x. This, however, is
impossible because x1 + x2 >+1>y 1+y 2for every y 2 L by the choice
of . Thus, we have a contradiction, and the proof is complete.
2
This impossibility result does not extend to the case n =2 : t h e r e ,w ec a n
nd nondictatorial solutions that are ecient with respect to maximin regret
preferences. We start the analysis by dening a monotone u-path.4 A mono-
tone u-path is a function w :( −1;0] ! I R2
− satisfying for all s;t 2 (−1;0]
with s  t:
(i) w1(s)+w 2( s )=s
(ii) w(s)  w(t).
Let W denote the collection of all monotone u-paths. With each w 2 W we
associate a monotone u-path bargaining solution F w, dened as follows. For
a two-person bargaining problem S,
fF
w(S)g = P(S) \f u ( S)+w( s )js2( −1;0]g:
It is easy to see that F w is well-dened. Observe that this denition cannot
straightforwardly be extended to more than two players: the set on the right-
hand side of the equation could be empty. We have the following result.
Theorem 2 Let n =2 , and let F be a bargaining solution. Then F is
ecient with respect to u =(  u
1;:::; u
n)if, and only if, F is a monotone
u-path solution.
Proof We leave verication of the if-part to the reader. For the only-if part,
let F be a bargaining solution that is ecient with respect to u.
4See Thomson and Myerson (1980) for a study of solutions dened with the aid of
monotone paths.
7First, for every −1 <t<0 dene the set Vt := fx 2 I R2
− j x1 + x2 
t; x1  t; x2  tg. Dene w :( −1;0] ! I R2
− by w(0) := 0 and w(t): =F( V t)
for every t<0. By Lemma 1, w satises property (i), and by Lemma 2, w
satises property (ii) of a monotone u-path. Hence, w is a monotone u-path.
The proof is completed by showing that F = F w. By construction,
F(Vt)=F w ( V t ) for every t<0. Let S 2Bwith u(S) = 0, and let
t := F w
1 (S)+F w
2 (S). Then F w(S)=Fw( V t)=F( V t). BecauseF(Vt) 2 P(S),
Lemma 2 implies F(S)=F( V t), hence F(S)=Fw( S ).
Finally, consider S 2Barbitrary. Then F(S)=F w( S ) by the previous
part of the proof and translation covariance of F, see the remark following
the proof of Lemma 2. This completes the proof.
2
A well-known example of a monotone u-path solution is the equal-loss solu-
tion, described by the monotone u-path w with wi(t)=w j( t ) for all t<0
and all i;j 2 N. This may be singled out by adding an axiom of anonymity
or symmetry. See also Chun (1988).
4 Minimax regret and scale covariance
In this section we modify the minimax regret preference relation in order to
accommodate the scale covariance property. At the same time an impossi-
bility result as in the previous section will be avoided.
As o l u t i o nFis called scale covariant if aF(S)+b=F( aS + b) for all
a 2 I Rn
++ and b 2 I Rn.5 Bargainer i's minimax regret preference may be
normalized to a preference ~ 
u
i as follows. For all (S;S0) 2BBand all






















Observe that this preference|called normalized minimax regret preference|
is regular, so that Lemma 1 still applies. Instead of Lemma 2 we have the
following lemma, which we state without proof.
5Here we use the notation ax := (a1x1;:::;a nx n)a n daS := fy 2 I Rn j y =
ax for some x 2 Sg, for all a;x 2 I Rn and S  I Rn.



















for every i 2 N.
Together with Lemma 1, Lemma 3 implies in particular that such an F is
scale covariant: take T = aS + b with a and b as in the denition of scale
covariance.
We will characterize all solutions that are ecient with respect to the
normalized minimax regret preferences by considering normalized monotone
u-paths. Such a normalized monotone u-path is a function z :[ 1 ;n]!I R n
+




(b) z(s)  z(t)
(c) z(s)  (1;1;:::;1).
Let Z denote the collection of all normalized monotone u-paths. With each
z 2 Z we associate a normalized montone u-path bargaining solution F z,
dened as follows. For a bargaining problem S 2Bwith d(S)=( 0 ;0 ;:::;0)
and u(S)=( 1 ;1 ;:::;1) let
fF
z(S)g = P(S) \f z( s )js2[1;n]g:
For an arbitrary S dene F z(S)=aF z(a0(S − d(S))) + d(S), where a :=
u(S)−d(S)a n da 02I R nis dened by a0
i := (ui(S)−di(S))−1.O b s e r v et h a t
F zis well dened in particular by strict comprehensiveness of S,a n dt h a t
F zis scale covariant by denition.
Theorem 3 Let n  2, and let F be a bargaining solution. Then F is





n)if, and only if, F is a normalized
monotone u-path solution.
9Proof The if-part is left to the reader. For the only-if part, let F be a
bargaining solution that is ecient with respect to ~ u.
Let V1 := fx 2 I Rn
+ j
Pn
i=1 xi =1 gand for every 1 <t<nand 0 <<
( n−t ) =n let
V






xi = t; xi   for all i 2 Ng:
Observe that every such V 
t is a well-dened bargaining problem, that is,
V 
t 2B . Dene z :[ 1 ;n]!I R n
+ as follows. Let z(1) := F(V1)a n dz ( n ): =




then let z(t) be equal to this point F(V 
t ). This construction is independent
of  in view of the dominance property established in Lemma 3. The same
lemma also implies that, if such an  exists for t then it also exists for all
1 <t 0<t .L e t t  nbe the supremum of all t for which such an  exists.
Dene z( t) := limt! tz(t), and for  t<tnlet z(t) be the point on the line
segment connecting z( t)a n dz ( n ) with sum of the coordinates equal to t.I t
is easily seen that z is a normalized monotone u-path.
Let S 2B . It is sucient to show that F(S)=F z ( S ). In view of
scale covariance of F z and F we may assume without loss of generality
that d(S)=( 0 ; 0 ;:::;0) and u(S)=( 1 ; 1 ;:::;1). Let 1  t<nwith
t =
Pn
i=1 Fi(S). There is an  with F z(S)=F z( V 
t)=F ( V 
t) by construc-
tion of z and denition of F z. Because F(V 
t ) 2 P(S), Lemma 3 implies
F(S)=F( Vt
), hence F(S)=Fz( S ). This completes the proof.
2
A well-known example of a normalized monotone u-path solution is the
Raia-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Raia, 1953; Kalai and Smorodinsky,
1975), described by the path z with zi(t)=z j ( t ) for all i;j 2 N and
1  t  n. This solution may be characterized by adding an axiom of
anonymity or symmetry.
Normalized monotone u-path solutions may be characterized, alterna-
tively, by requiring eciency with respect to a (normalized version of) the
maximin criterion, namely the preference ~ d
i for bargainer i dened as fol-























10A proof of the suggested characterization is left to the reader. It should
be noted that such a \dual" characterization does not hold for the non-
normalized, non-scale-covariant versions, as follows from comparing our re-
sults with those in Bossert et al. (1996). In the latter paper strict compre-
hensiveness is not imposed. This leads to some technical complications and
the necessity to impose an additional axiom of continuity on the bargaining
solutions. For (non-normalized) maximin preferences, however, Bossert et al.
(1996) obtain a class of monotone path solutions, and this result can easily
be adapted to our framework. In contrast, for (non-normalized) minimax
regret preferences, we have an impossibility result in the case of more than
two players (see Theorem 1).
5 Concluding remarks
The approach followed in Bossert et al. (1996) and in this paper is essentially
based on the idea that a rich underlying structure with respect to individual
decision making may be used to derive implications for collective decision
making while only imposing relatively mild additional requirements. The
individual decision criteria used in this paper are minimax regret and a nor-
malized version thereof. In Bossert and Peters (1998), this idea is applied
to multi-attribute individual and collective decision making in an expected-
utility framework. Interpreted in a bargaining context, the results obtained
there lead to generalized (nonsymmetric) Nash and utilitarian solutions.
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